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Abstract: 
The pattern of adoption of high-performance work practices (HPWPs) has been 
explained in terms of strategic contingency and in terms of union presence. We 
compare the post-deregulation / privatization changes in work practice at AT&T, Bell 
Atlantic and BT. On the basis of these cases, we argue that the choice of new work 
practices should be understood as a consequence not only of the company's resources 
or changes in its environment, nor of a simple union presence, but also as a 
consequence of the practices’ affects on union power, the nature of the union's 
engagement, and the union's strategic choices.  
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1. Introduction. 
In this paper we examine changes in work practice in the context of interactions 
between corporate strategy and industrial relations. Specifically, we consider the 
cases of three telecommunications companies – British Telecom (BT) in the UK, Bell 
Atlantic and AT&T of the US in the aftermath of deregulation. Several unions are 
present at the three firms, but for the most part we are concerned with the 
Communication Workers' Union (CWU), formerly National Communications Union, 
in Britain and the Communications Workers of America (CWA) in the US. We 
examine the strategic choices faced by the three companies; the potential 
contribution of new work practices to these various strategic paths; and, in particular, 
the role of unions in shaping the work practices actually chosen and implemented.  
The three companies were all, at about the same time, thrust into competitive 
environments by government action - privatization for BT, break-up and deregulation 
for Bell Atlantic/AT&T. This occurred at a time when unions in both countries had 
been weakened by the withdrawal of many legal protections and were facing large 
losses of membership and bargaining coverage throughout the private sector. The 
weakened position of the unions together with the intense competitive pressure on 
the companies might seem to leave little room for strategic choice in the area of 
industrial relations.  Yet, we find that in all three cases, strategic interaction between 
company and union affected the nature of the work practices adopted. An implication 
of this finding is that, for both company and union, strategic choices about work 
practices should be regarded as contingent not only on exogenous environmental 
factors or other elements of the organization's own strategy, but the strategy of its 
negotiating partner. While environmental factors play an important role in narrowing 
 2 
 
 the sets of feasible strategies and of possible outcomes, strategies (and hence 
outcomes) are also contingent on historically embedded expectations, and on the 
choices made by various actors. 
Both in its use of case studies, and in its emphasis on the interaction of 
environmental factors with strategic and contingent ones, this paper follows in a long 
tradition in industrial relations (see, for instance, Levinson 1960; Ross 1947a; Ross 
1947b; Weber 1969). It brings to this tradition a particular interest in the role of new 
work practices. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The literatures on high-
performance work practices, the strategic contingency of work practices, and 
industrial relations and high performance work practices (HPWPs), are each 
reviewed briefly in Section 2. The background of telecommunications in the UK and 
US over the past period is summarized in Section 3. Data collection and methodology 
are provided in Section 4. The particular external and internal circumstances of each 
company, the response by management and unionised employees, and the outcomes, 
are considered in Section 5. We evaluate the implications and conclusions of our 
findings in Section 6.  
 
2. Strategic contingency in employer’s choice of work practices  
Modern management theory has developed a range of prescriptions relating to work 
practice. These have a collection of deep roots, including but not limited to the 
human relations school of management, Japanese lean production and total quality 
management systems. Different authorities have described the contemporary 
versions of these practices differently; what they have in common is a claim, on the 
part of their advocates, to be non-Taylorist. The claim to a departure from Taylorism 
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 comes from the acknowledgement, development and systematic use of the skills and 
knowledge of production employees. Various packages of practices have acquired 
various labels, including high-performance work practice system, high-involvement 
work practice, and simply human resource management (HRM). We adopt the term 
'high performance work practice' (HPWP) for this paper. 
To their advocates, such practices offer a win-win situation for labour and capital: 
for workers, jobs should become more interesting and challenging, while skills, 
productivity, and wages all should rise; for employers, rising productivity, and 
improved product and service quality, should lead to increased profits. In competitive 
markets, improved productivity and/or quality may be necessary for competitive 
survival and thus a concern for all of an organization's stakeholders.  
From a belief in the promise of win-win come two puzzles: one is that most 
employers do not implement any version of the prescribed sets of packages on a 
sustained basis (Appelbaum, et al. 2000; Delery and Doty 1996; Guest 1997; Huselid 
1995); the other is that the response to the new practices by workers and their unions 
ranges from strong opposition to enthusiastic support, and from acceptance of 
management's definition of new practices to aggressive engagement in shaping them 
(Godard 2004; Harley 2002; Kersely, et al. 2005; Kinnie, et al. 2005; Nolan and 
O’Donnell 2003; Ramsay, et al. 2000). 
One explanation for the lack of universal adoption is that the benefits of the 
practices are strategically contingent. Porter (1985) links HPWPs to strategies of 
focus and differentiation, but not to low cost strategies. Miles and Snow (1984) take a 
similar line, but link HPWPs to innovation rather than differentiation/focus. Studies 
in manufacturing have found that HPWPs are matched with flexible and high quality 
production systems (Arthur 1994; MacDuffie 1995; Youndt, et al. 1996), consistent 
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 with the strategic contingency view. Sako and Jackson (2006), studying two 
telecommunications companies in Germany and Japan, find that centralization or 
decentralization of company HR functions is contingent on both company and union 
strategies, and on the relative power of the actors. 
From the strategic perspective, in the case of the three telecommunications 
companies studied here, we can identify two factors which could be expected to affect 
the work and employment practices adopted. One is that some of the technologies 
being used by the companies were changing fast, and it was by no means clear which 
technologies would be important in future years. Each company had a choice between 
continuing to develop technical competencies internally, and switching to the market, 
obtaining competencies through acquisitions or contracting as needs became clear. 
Each strategy has implications for HR practice: the internal competency strategy 
requires ongoing skill upgrading, retention of skilled employees, and an 
organizational capacity to re-deploy resources internally in response to technological 
changes. The second strategy offers the possibility of saving some of the costs 
associated with the first. 
The second strategic factor is the relationship with customers. Each company 
wants to sell its customers more services; to economize on the cost of dealing with 
customer inquiries; to avoid losing customers to other service providers; and, given 
that telecommunications in both the US and the UK is a regulated industry, to avoid 
problems with customers that would hurt the company in the public arena.  
Controlling the distribution of gains 
The strategic contingency arguments just reviewed assume that employees cooperate 
in the introduction of new work programmes and that the employer captures at least 
part of the productivity gains. In practice, however, the distribution of productivity 
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 gains is contested; the anticipated distribution of these gains will affect both 
employees’ cooperation with HPWP programmes, and the employer’s desire to adopt 
such programmes.  
The question is complicated by the fact that any particular HPWP package is likely 
to alter the balance of bargaining power in favour of either employees or employers. 
The possible tilt towards employers is well understood, and is reflected in hyper-
Taylorism and management-by-stress narratives. It is important also to understand 
the possibility of a tilt in favour of employees, because its prospect can limit the scope 
of HPWPs adopted by employers. Drago (1996), for instance, shows that where a 
company keeps establishments in competition with each other, under threat of 
closure, the HPWP package tends not to include voice mechanisms. General Motors’ 
unwillingness to extend its highly participatory Saturn model to the rest of the 
company, despite the Tennessee factory’s success in producing high-quality cars, has 
often been understood as a recognition that Saturn workers had a level of control 
over work intensity that was inconsistent with profit maximization (Shaiken, et al. 
1997). Relationships between employees and customers, a key part of some customer 
service programmes, can also enhance the collective bargaining power of employees 
(Guy 2003). 
The contest for control of the distribution of productivity gains can, then, affect the 
size of the gains. Can we say anything about how? Black and Lynch (2001) find, in the 
case of US manufacturing, that productivity gains from HPWPs are significantly 
higher when a union is present (in fact, they find no statistically significant 
productivity boost from HPWPs when no union is present); Black and Lynch 
attribute this result to a union voice effect. But do unions and their members gain 
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 from the rise in productivity that the union appears to facilitate? Here, the answers 
are less clear.  
There is much research, but no consensus, on the question of whether HPWPs and 
unions are, as institutions, complements or substitutes. The substitution hypothesis 
takes two forms: one, that HPWPs reduce worker demand for unions by making 
workers more satisfied with their jobs and legitimating cooperation with 
management, the other that cooperation with HPWPs weakens the union's ability to 
represent workers. The complementarity hypothesis is that management-initiated 
involvement works better when workers have credible mechanisms for voice and due 
process. 
Machin and Wood (2005) take institutional substitution to be the conventional 
view, citing Guest (1989) and Fiorito (2001); searching for evidence of substitution in 
the UK Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys from 1980-98, they find none.  
Godard starts with the assumption that conventional wisdom favours 
complementarity, citing Heckscher (1988), Kochan and Osterman (1994), Marshall 
(1992), and Rubinstein and Kochan (2001);  reviewing a vast body of literature, he 
finds that the effect on unions (and workers) is 'ambiguous, if not negative' (p.  371). 
We are left with no general rule as to how we should expect unions to regard HPWPs. 
There is a bit more clarity, but only just, about how unions get better or worse 
outcomes for their members when HPWPs are on the agenda. Different unions (or 
local union branches) take different positions. In the UK, for instance, most union 
policy and strategy in relation to HPWPs can be categorised as some form of ‘positive 
engagement’, generally conforming to the approach adopted by the Transport and 
General Workers’ Union in the mid-1990s and the TUC itself (Fisher 1995; TUC 
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 1994).3 This essentially advocates a negotiated approach to HPWPs, with the union 
resisting some practices, whilst supporting the introduction of others particularly 
related to increased job security, equal opportunities, improved training 
opportunities and better internal communications. Part of the logic of this strategy is 
that many HPWPs are ambiguous and open to alternative interpretations that unions 
might exploit, a logic underpinning the endorsement by some unions and the TUC of 
partnership agreements (Ackers and Payne 1998). 
In assessing the outcome of partnership, Kelly (1996) suggests that unions militant 
in their orientation are better able to defend against opportunistic behaviour on the 
part of management, and thus his argument lends support for union refusal to 
cooperate with the introduction of new work practices. Kelly defines union militancy 
in terms of union ideology, goals, methods, the mobilisation of union membership 
and use of institutional resources, and as historically relative and environmentally 
constrained – a definition we broadly assume below in our report and discussion of 
the three case studies.  Kelly’s union militancy argument is linked to both general and 
more specific factors affecting the balance of power between the parties and which 
may thus provide sources of union leverage in the bargaining situation. In this regard, 
Batstone (1988, 223-35) highlights worker and union resources and possible 
sanctions, union goals and union strategic considerations related to judgements 
about their chances of success, as well as production system, product and labour 
                                                 
3 Exceptions to this are the unqualified endorsement of HPWPs in the UK through single 
union no-strike deals, signed by the engineering and electricians’ unions particularly in the 
1980s and early 1990s; and also the policy of direct opposition to HPWPs adopted by the 
British postal workers’ section of the Communication Workers’ Union in the mids-1990s 
(Beale 2003; Gall 2003). 
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 market, and institutional factors; many of these factors are also taken into account in 
Katz and Darbishire’s (2000) study. 
However, Frost (2001), studying changes in work practice at three North American 
steel plants, argues that the relevant variable is not whether the union is militant or 
cooperative, but whether it is proactive or reactive with regard to the HPWP proposal 
(it is noteworthy that the two plants in her study which had good outcomes for the 
workers also had substantial productivity and quality improvements).  
While this body of research does not come to unambiguous conclusions as to the 
best strategies for workers and their unions in response to proposals for HPWPs, they 
do all lend support to the view that the actions of unions can make a difference to the 
outcomes of these programmes, for both the employer and the employees (Beale 
2003; Darlington 2002). What we argue here is that employer and union choices with 
respect to new work practices should be understood in terms of strategic interaction, 
and that much of the variation in the adoption and outcome of these practices can be 
understood if we understand this interaction. The following section provides the 
background to the evolution of strategy and industrial relations in the three 
companies.  
 
3. Evolution of telecommunication services in the UK and US 
The common factor uniting the history of both AT&T and BT was the early drive 
towards fast-track deregulation and privatisation from the mid 1980s onwards. BT 
was the first nationalised company in the UK to be privatised in 1984. During the 
same decade, private operators were allowed to build their own communication 
networks, enter the mobile phone area and compete in telephony services through 
entry into the cable television market. Deregulation in the US began in 1984 with the 
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 divestiture of AT&T’s 22 local phone companies. Ownership of the latter was 
transferred to 7 Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) with the right to sell 
local and toll calling in local areas (Dodd 2000).  
Despite their apparent similarities, the BT and AT&T systems differed in 
important ways and Britain and the US approached the governance of these 
monopolies differently, in ways typical of the policies of the two countries: AT&T was 
owned by private shareholders, while BT was owned by the state. Regulation of AT&T 
was driven by the concept that private business should satisfy customer needs, in 
terms of access to phone lines, time to fix repairs and quality of operator services. The 
nationalisation of telecommunication services in the UK was, by contrast, driven by 
the belief that the state could run and organise certain strategic enterprises for the 
overall public interest. The distinction between 'customers' and 'the public' is a subtle 
one, but does reflect a real difference in orientation. 
The differences between the industrial relations systems of the two countries are 
also striking. In the US, non-union operation - even if this requires breaking a well- 
established collective bargaining relationship - is a serious option for most private 
sector employers; breaking established unions in ex-nationalised sectors has been far 
less common in the UK. Regulated industries have been an oasis for US unions in an 
otherwise hostile environment, and so de-regulation posed a particular threat to 
unions in those industries. The different national IR environments, combined with 
the different systems of governance for the telephone systems and the philosophies 
that came with them, contributed to differences in the traditions of industrial 
relations within the two companies.  
In the UK, BT’s position as a state owned company meant that the logic of work 
organisation and industrial relations was shaped by the expectation, prevalent in the 
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 mid-twentieth century when both the public sector and the telephone system were 
growing rapidly, that trade unions would, and should be, part of the framework of 
public service provision. In return for moderation from the trade union leaders, 
unions at BT were provided with a degree of institutional security and became 
involved in the negotiation with management over issues that went well beyond pay 
and conditions. Recruitment, training, evaluation, promotion and discipline were all 
subject to wide ranging national agreements as were many aspects of work 
organisation such as staffing levels and ratios, working conditions and working 
practices, and the introduction of new equipment and systems (Batstone, et al. 1984). 
The grading structure in BT was extremely formalised. The 130 different grades for 
staff below management underlined the highly developed internal labour market with 
clearly marked out career paths for progression within a hierarchy and for movement 
within a “senior salary structure” (ibid.). Extensive seniority based benefits existed 
and career ladders were almost exclusively filled from within (Schacht 1985). In areas 
of corporate life such as investment strategy and policy issues however, the unions 
had little or no say.  
The industrial relations situation in the Bell System evolved rather differently. The 
CWA had to fight for recognition in the face of strong management opposition to 
independent unions. Initially, the company unions became the basis for fragmented 
but independent labour unions that won recognition (Craypo 1986) but it was not 
until 1974 that system-wide contracts were negotiated. Whilst the CWA was able to 
achieve a strong bargaining position and generous pay and benefits for its members, 
the inherent distrust between managers and unions was expressed in significant 
differences in the evolution of managerial responsibility between BT and the Bell 
System. In BT, direct supervision of tasks in network areas was often left to the 
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 Technical Officers (TOs) and Inspectors, a type of foreman. In the Bell System on the 
other hand, the number of managers as a proportion of the workforce was 
considerably higher. Batt (1995) for example reports that the proportion of 
managerial jobs in the AT&T workforce grew from 13.5% in 1950 to 29.4% in 1980, 
which compares to just 14% for BT in 1985.   
During the divestiture proceedings, in which the terms of AT&T's break-up were 
determined, both the CWA and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
(IBEW) took the company's side, and in return AT&T committed to continuing 
systemwide bargaining for both unions. 
In the early 1990s, following the privatization of BT and the break-up of the Bell 
System, BT, Nynex (or Bell Atlantic as it was known by then) and AT&T faced similar 
challenges, although from very different positions. Bell Atlantic and BT both 
remained responsible to the regulator for universal coverage and maintenance of the 
basic telephone system. This limited the degree to which standards could be allowed 
to deteriorate through labour shedding. However, although both companies retained 
ownership over the local loop and competition was only gradually opened up, their 
reliance on traditional voice business rather than value added services, underlined 
the danger that by relying on the traditional source of income and the ownership of 
the network, the organisations in effect would be reduced to becoming a mere bit 
transporter for the value added services of other low cost competitors.  
 
4. Research design and data collection method 
 The empirical data that this paper draws upon comes from 43 semi-structured 
interviews that took place in three companies, British Telecom, Bell Atlantic and 
AT&T between 2000 and 2002 (Ramirez 2002). The interviews across the three 
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 companies included 10 line managers, 5 senior managers, 16 non-management 
employees, one contractor and 10 union officials, including one general secretary 
(Connect) and one district president (CWA district 1). Twenty-five of the interviews 
were with BT employees or union officials working with BT in Connect and the CWU, 
the remainder with Bell Atlantic and AT&T employees or union officials from the 
CWA. Interviews in BT principally covered customer service, network engineering 
and human resource areas. In AT&T interviews took place with CWA officials and 
with a focus group of five senior human resource managers at the AT&T Corporate 
Headquarters in Bedminster, New Jersey. Similarly, at Bell Atlantic a series of 
interviews took place with CWA officials in Chicago and CWA’s Distict One in New 
York City, and with Human Resource Managers at the corporate headquarters in 
Malborough, Massachutsetts. Two interviews also took place with Bell Atlantic 
splicing technicians in Philadelphia.  
 The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed; each lasted in the region of 1-
1.5 hours. There were however a number of exceptions, including a focus group in 
AT&T and a meeting with Bell Atlantic senior HR managers, both of which lasted one 
whole morning. Interviews in Philadelphia with splicing technicians involved 
shadowing a technician for most part of a day.  Documentary evidence, including 
AT&T and Bell Atlantic employment contracts and from Human Resource 
departments, was also collected.  
As with any industry level study, the prospect of learning something which can be 
generalized to other settings depends on the implicit use of the institutional and 
technological features of the industry as a set of controls; similarly, confining such a 
study to countries with broadly similar institutional frameworks is in aid of 
understanding differences within those frameworks. The fact that the three 
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 companies, and their respective unions, were going through similar regulatory and 
technological transitions in the same period, makes for something of a natural 
experiment. Within the industry, countries, and time frame chosen, and given the 
practical limits on the number of observations imposed by the case study method, the 
cases were chosen with the aim of shedding light on the range of outcomes within 
that frame.  
Questions of reliability and validity of the case study were addressed during the 
fieldwork. It was possible to corroborate the reliability of much of the evidence by 
triangulating among different actors, addressing the same issues in interviews with 
union officials, human resource managers, and other employees of each of the 
companies.  Regarding the validity of the data, Strauss’s (1987) coding process was 
followed. The identification of codes and themes was based on the propositions laid 
out in sections two and three.  
 
5. Responses to re-structuring 
The demise of HPWPs: The case of AT&T 
Of the three companies in the post deregulation period, AT&T faced the biggest threat 
as a consequence of being exposed to the most intense competition and the loss of its 
direct access to the local customer. By 1989, just five years after AT&T’s divestiture, 
its two biggest competitors, MCI and Sprint, held 17% and 12% of the long distance 
market respectively and by 1994, AT&T’s share of the long distance market had fallen 
to 60% (FCC, 1992/1993). The result was a strategy of drastic downsizing combined 
with aggressive acquisitions that largely broke with its tradition of investment in its 
workforce and long-term employment.  
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 AT&Ts response to competition from private networks was a massive re-
investment programme in a largely maintenance free system with a capacity for 
transmitting voice, video, data and high quality service (Mansell 1993). This allowed 
the organisation to divest itself of large numbers of blue collared workers, who were 
replaced by a smaller number of white-collar staff with remote testing computer 
skills. The new white collar staff were paid 80% of former craft wages (ibid). 
Furthermore, unlike the RBOCs, AT&T’s faced no regulatory restrictions to moving 
employment between states, and this allowed it to consolidate hundreds of local 
operator and customer service centres into a handful of remote national centres.   
The downsizing programme in the aftermath of divestiture was originally seen as a 
short-term consolidation measure. However, as AT&T continued cutting into 
management and non-management numbers, downsizing increasingly became part 
of the routine of business operations and, unlike BT, came in the form of compulsory 
layoffs. Thus, between 1984 and 1992 out of a total of 107,291 union represented jobs 
that were lost, 58% were lost through compulsory layoffs (Keefe and Batt 1997). With 
the share price of AT&T tumbling in the late 1990s, Michael Armstrong’s 
appointment as CEO in 1998 was followed by the announcement that one in seven 
jobs would disappear, including one in four of the top 126 executives. Despite the 
number of top executives in the headline, and the historically management-heavy 
nature of the organization, the union-represented jobs were hit hardest, with union 
coverage falling to 42% of the workforce in 1996 and 28% in 2000.  
Over these years of restructuring, AT&T undertook two distinctly different types of 
HR initiatives. Firstly, there was a set of high involvement work practices aimed at 
leveraging the knowledge of employees at the workplace. One of the most important 
initiatives, known as Workplace of the Future, was a programme to try to improve 
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 communication between the grass roots and management. Established during the 
1992 collective bargaining period, it aimed to include union participation in human 
resource planning at all levels of the business. The programme involved the setting up 
of in-house committees in every business unit to talk about how to improve 
performance, flexibility and conditions at work. The remit of these committees was 
broad. The union hoped that this would lead to greater discretion for employees to 
provide quality service to the customer. For example, a CWA Union representative 
commented that there was an agreement under the scheme between management 
and unions to change to a more flexible work schedule of a ten-hour a day, four-day 
week. The union also hoped that this initiative would mark a change in management’s 
direction towards the use of non-union labour.  When this turned out not to be the 
case, locals (union branches) increasingly rebelled, and pulled out of negotiations 
with management. As the CWA Union rep comments… 
“It was popular for management because it helped them streamline the business 
and get rid of some more employees. We here were one of the first to say we’re 
not having anything to do with this, we said “Workplace of the Future, Thing of 
the Past”. I was going to Indiana, everyone was losing their job and they had a 
banner saying “Workplace of the Future”, something was just wrong” (AT&T 
CWA Rep Local 42/50 network).   
The only area where the Workplace of the Future took hold was in the Network 
Services Division, which is where the union is strongest. The union cooperated with 
the programme only where it had the strength to contain management opportunism.  
A second set of initiatives was aimed at cushioning the impact of the downsizing on 
employees. The most developed of these emerged as a result of bargaining with the 
union represented employees and included the “Alliance for Employee Growth and 
 16 
 
 Development”, negotiated in 1986, where the CWA was actively involved in re-skilling 
employees at risk of downsizing and the “AT&T transfer system” (ATS), also set up in 
1986, that provided employees “at risk” of losing their jobs priority status for new 
openings in the core business. This would mean that some basic skills requirements 
usually needed to move into certain positions would be waived. The important 
limitation to this initiative in AT&T was that it applied to openings in occupational 
(union) jobs only, which was precisely where there were fewest opportunities for 
employment growth.  
A central feature of AT&T’s restructuring strategy during the 1990s was the 
transformation from a corporation with a unified structure into a set of discrete 
business units with little operational interdependence and no common employment 
grading structure. In other respects, company strategy at AT&T changed radically a 
number of times over the decade, making both organisational initiatives to develop 
in-house communication amongst different groups of employees and stable 
projections of future skills sets extremely difficult to make. In the words of a senior 
AT&T human resource manager, 
“we’re turning the company upside down in many ways, sometimes you don’t 
have five years, in a month you have to decide to go out and buy a skill set by 
acquiring a company. That is a change and transition, where before we had 
plenty of time to plan, we had organisations that worked on the basis of 5-year 
plans, you don’t hear about that anymore” (AT&T HR Vice-President Workforce 
planning, Corporate Headquarters). 
Concerned about a loss of competence, some attempts to encourage further intra-
firm mobility were discussed at high levels, thus retaining the accumulated 
experience of employees with knowledge of AT&T’s market (and reducing the 
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 material cost of continual turnover).  However, in practice, the borders between the 
permanent, variable and outsourced labour have been so unstable as to make 
medium term manpower planning impractical. As a senior AT&T senior human 
resource manager commented, 
“Maybe what we are seeing is that skills become obsolete very quickly. If 
that’s the case then the question comes do you need stability? By the time you 
rally everybody to be trained, the technology is gone, there is no need. Would 
the fact that people do not have stability matter?” (AT&T HR Vice-President 
Workforce planning, Corporate headquarters).  
In the context of AT&T’s business strategy, it is of little surprise that the 
unions refused to cooperate with HPWPs, making them largely ineffectual.  
 
Restructuring Mediaed by Labour and Consumer Welfare: The case of 
Nynex4 (Bell Atlantic) 
The evolution of company strategy at Nynex following deregulation has been 
dominated on the one hand by two key mergers and on the other by the militancy 
of the CWA, particularly its District One, that exclusively represented Nynex 
workers. The analysis is consciously focussed on this relationship because in the 
USA labour markets, regulatory policies and indeed CWA district policies tend to 
vary by State level. Up until 1991, Nynex appeared to be following a cost cutting 
path in response to competition from Teleport and MFS (Keefe and Batt 1997). 
From 1989 onward however, the company adopted a policy with respect to labour 
that marked it out from other RBOCs. Two factors played a significant role here. 
                                                 
4 Nynex was formed in 1984 as the regional Bell operating company for New York and New England 
areas following deregulation. Nynex acquired Bell Atlantic in 1997, at which time it took the Bell 
Atlantic name. On June 30th 2000, Bell Atlantic acquired GTE to form Verizon Communications.  
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 The first was the tough stance of the local New York regulator. This meant that, 
until recently, the company could not interrupt services for more than 24 hours, no 
matter what reason the company gave. So important changes in practices often 
meant hiring more staff. 
A second factor has been the role and strategy of the CWA District One. The latter 
has taken a strong position against management attempts to attack employee 
benefits, including a bitter 17-week strike in 1989 against cuts in health insurance. 
The CWA has consistently used the defence of consumer welfare to argue for the 
maintenance of jobs and standard of training. This tactic was particularly effective 
during the 1989 strike where it managed to convince the New York PUC to refuse the 
company’s request to raise rates.  
The strength of the union has had a significant impact on the shape of work 
practice initiatives in both customer services and network engineering. In the former, 
one of the main points of conflict has been management attempts to use workplace 
re-organizations as a means to intensify the labour process. Changes in work 
organisation in customer service were often associated with employee stress and 
overwork. For this reason the union has generally refused to co-operate with 
proposed changes in work practice. Only where management has allowed the union 
to influence the agenda have workplace initiatives been successful. A graphic example 
of this emerged in 1995-6 through what almost became a major confrontation 
between management and unions in the customer service area of New York City. The 
source of the conflict lay in a perception by management that existing staff would not 
be able to handle the projected increase in call volume, jeopardising customer service 
and exposing the company to fines and penalties from the regulator. A management 
team was put into place and 4 or 5 months later came up with a deal to contract out 
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 the work of the equivalent of 350 representatives (employees) to a firm in Ohio, 
assuming that an existing no-strike deal would allow the change to go forward 
smoothly. The union threatened to go on strike and tear up the no-strike agreement if 
any calls were diverted, but asked management to delay plans for a week while the 
union came up with a counter proposal. As the CWA rep comments:    
“Our initiatives included taking people from training and helping them 
support staff, putting certain projects that weren’t essential on hold, taking 
people they had assigned for acting management back on the job. We said “here 
you are, we’ve quantified this, we’re giving you the equivalent of 350 jobs” and 
their response was “this is great with your 350 and the 350 we’ll contract out 
that’s 700 people”. We said “you don’t get it, throw one call and we’re on strike”. 
Finally a guy in management labour relations said to them “are you nuts they’ve 
just done your work in 1 week that took you 5 months”. They then went outside 
and said Ok, we won’t be contracting” (CWA rep District one)   
Two further ambitious initiatives for workplace re-organisation in network 
maintenance, one led by management, one initiated by the CWA, illustrate the 
contest for control of work organization within Nynex / Bell Atlantic.  The first 
involved the setting up of the Super Tech job title that emerged from the 1994 
contract provision with the CWA. It involves a two-year training programme in which 
a technician would become versed in the skills of inside switching and outside cable, 
transmission and maintenance. This would allow the individuals to do splicing and 
residential repair and move easily from the customer house to the central office 
exchange.  
The fortunes of the Super-Tech initiative have been mixed. Although the union did 
not object to the title, it appears that the initiative worked only in rural areas where 
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 there are a large number of low volume subscriber lines and one technician has the 
time to do a number of jobs.  In the urban areas, such as in Long Island, the union 
representatives say that it had failed miserably.  This was mainly because the more 
intensive division of labour had caused a backlog of work. As a consequence, the 
Super Tech title no longer exists on Long Island. 
The second intitiative was the CWA’s proposal of a Technical Telecommunications 
Associate (TTA) title appears to have had more success than the Super Tech 
initiative. The TTA title was developed and designed by the CWA as a means of 
keeping represented members on the cutting edge of their skill and therefore avoid 
giving the company an excuse to bring in outside companies to undertake work with 
new technology.  Training relies on deepening existing skills by adding new 
technologies and lateral skilling in new areas, including learning concepts of team-
work and communication and incorporating certain management tasks. Hence, 
rather than training the employee to undertake a longer list of existing tasks, as was 
the case with the Super Tech, the TTA training is designed to meet the challenges of 
the future by training employees to work with a range of cutting edge technology, 
including DSL. It is akin to a one-stop shop for engineers that would be viable in a 
high tech, computer related environment, such as large customers in Wall Street, 
where engineers could deal more effectively with a problem from beginning to the 
end. This programme has represented a big investment for Bell Atlantic, with some 
1200 Bell Atlantic technicians on the course in 1999 and around 300 having 
graduated. Significantly the CWA has also convinced other RBOCs including GTE, 
SBC and US West to undertake similar initiatives.  
The distinctive route towards skill formation and labour practices that Nynex 
adopted between 1991 and 1999 went against a general trend in the industry towards 
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 re-locating customer service and network operations as a means to reduce costs. Yet, 
given the weakness of coordinating institutions to establish norms of training or 
labour practices beyond the firm, industrial relations agreements in the modern US 
telecommunications industry are inevitably unstable. Thus, when Nynex merged into 
Bell Atlantic in 1996, a change in management stance towards the unions was 
evident. Management began to resist the extension of union representation into new 
growth areas, such as wireless and interest in outsourcing was renewed.  
The CWA did maintain its militant approach and political engagement after the 
merger, with some success. When, in 1995, Bell Atlantic announced its intention to 
break the industry pattern of wage increases and other improvements that the CWA 
had negotiated with the other RBOCs, CWA District One waged a successful five and 
a half month campaign of workplace mobilization that included refusal of voluntary 
overtime, street demonstrations, candlelight vigils and so called “just practising 
pickets”. The union ran TV ads and appeals to the general public to block enquiry 
calls and 900 calls that generate significant revenue for the company (CWA, Spring 
2000). One of the union's levers was the threat of mobilizing the public against 
regulatory changes sought by the company. In the end, the CWA and Nynex agreed 
that there would be no forced transfers, layoffs or downgrades of bargaining unit 
workers because of the merger. The company then concentrated its cost-cutting 
reductions on the (historically dense) ranks of managers. 
Nonetheless, District 1’s power did erode following the merger. One reason for this 
was the decentralisation and downgrading of the labour relations function in the 
merged company. A point made by the CWA’s District 1 head of Research was that 
after the merger the labour relations staff from the old Nynex were changed and the 
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 labour relations department was downgraded so that deals could not be worked out 
because the individuals did not have the authority.  
The deterioration in labour relations culminated in a two week strike by 72,000 
customer service CWA members in August 2000 against forced overtime (workers 
can be asked to work an extra 10, 15 and in some cases 20 hours a week in overtime), 
job stress and job security. The result of the strike was that the union agreed to allow 
the company to transfer work from one call centre to another, while the company 
gave some ground on the issue of forced overtime. Verizon management also agreed 
to an expedited process to allow the CWA to organize workers in its rapidly 
expanding, and chiefly non-union, wireless division.  
The case of BT 
After its privatisation in 1984 the UK telecommunications market was 
progressively opened up to competition, although it was only in 2005 that Oftel, the 
UK regulator, recommended allowing outside companies full access to the BT 
exchanges. This should allow rival companies full control over a customer’s line over 
the final mile.  
BT’s initial response after privatisation was to undertake a massive programme of 
investment, around £2bn a year, to update its network and increase efficiency. 
Digitalisation of the network increased from 23% of the network in 1988 to 64% in 
1992. This was mirrored by a move to introduce intelligent networks that had the aim 
of shifting traffic back onto the public network by offering virtual private networks to 
create new revenues5.  
                                                 
5 It has also been argued that as well as being able to provide new services, one of the principal aims of investing 
in the intelligent network has been as part of a pre-emptive measure to deny competitors access to the public 
network (Mansell 1993).   
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 The decade and a half after privatisation, employment relations in BT were 
dominated by the impact of job losses, management pressure for changes in working 
practices and the use of contractors and agency employees in a range of functions. 
Between 1981 and 1998 some 135,000 posts, representing roughly half the BT 
workforce disappeared. New technology was partly responsible for a large number of 
job losses, particularly in the exchanges, where digitisation of the equipment allowed 
the mechanical parts to be largely disposed of, making groups of skills completely 
redundant. Perhaps more significantly however, management abandoned the tightly 
governed work practices that were a feature of previous national agreements with the 
unions.  
The National Communications Union response to the job cull was largely reactive 
and defensive partly because, unlike the US companies, job cuts were achieved with 
no compulsory redundancies. This was achieved firstly because the regulator 
eschewed the break-up of BT, allowing the company to re-deploy large numbers of 
employees from manual engineering functions into customer service areas where job 
opportunities were growing within the organisation. Secondly, despite opposition to 
management, the ability of the Union to mobilize its membership was limited to due 
to the relatively generous redundancy package, that on average cost the company 
£35,000 per employee (Batt and Darbishire 1997), leading to a massive over-
response by employees, some 45,000 applied for voluntary redundancy.  
However, Union strategies also need to be understood in the context of the 
post-Thatcher reforms that were designed to severely marginalize (though not de-
recognize) Unions over substantive issues and narrow the bargaining agenda in the 
context of a hostile regulatory environment, a process that was particularly evident in 
ex-nationalised companies such as BT. Moreover, in the context of sharp 
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 technological change that reduced the need for manual jobs and despite a Broad Left 
leadership, the NCU was unwilling or unable to adopt an offensive position against 
management. On the contrary, the union took the view that it was still able to 
influence BT management in identifying employee grievances and in particular, 
encourage greater employee re-training and re-deployment of staff in return for 
employer access to good quality training and career development (CWU 1999).  
The success of the HPWP initiatives in BT was mixed. Management attempted to 
introduce workplace team briefings to discuss and potentially share innovative ideas 
and there is evidence from National Communications Union surveys to suggest that 
employees valued these initiatives (Ferner and Terry 1997). However, it also appears 
that these initiatives were undermined by the downsizing drives, disappearing career 
opportunities and pressure of work that cut across effective team building drives 
(ibid). As a result none of these systems were able to achieve much in the way of 
committed, innovative teamwork.  
This was the case in both engineering and customer service, where most employees 
faced a loss of task autonomy. Mobile engineers (i.e. those that work outside premises 
and homes), for example, were introduced to the Work Manager, a hand held 
terminal that allows a central controller in an office to direct engineers in the field to 
what jobs they have to do, where these jobs are located and the amount of time they 
have to do each job. This has been a major source of resentment because engineers 
felt it undervalued their skill and robbed them of discretion. As BT exchange 
engineers puts it, 
“Unfortunately BT is going down the realms of Work Manager, which is used 
in all the field staff. For short simple tasks it might work, but not intermittent 
problems that are quite common. When I was on Work Manager I basically 
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 fought the machine and wouldn’t let it get the better of me (BT non-
management technical officer)”.6  
BTs relationship with the CWU has been dominated by management challenges 
over union control over work organization while at the same time reaching 
compromise over job losses and re-grading exercises. In return for no compulsory 
redundancies, the CWU did not seriously oppose rationalization. Thus, the so-called 
"re-patterning agreement" between 1986-88 redefined engineering jobs so that staff 
could work on either installation or maintenance according to operational need. 
Fixed staffing ratios between higher and lower grade staff in work teams were 
abolished, allowing staffing to be adapted to variations in local circumstances (Tong 
1993).  
With the agreement of the CWU, management also achieved a profound re-grading 
exercise around “Project NewGRID” (the grid being a table showing the pay and 
grading structure) in 2000. This involves breaking down the strict specialisation of 
narrowly defined tasks that characterised previous grades. NewGrid will reduce the 
number of job grades from around 130 to 4 skill bands with a maximum of 8 pay 
points. This is designed to simplify the process of transferring employees into 
different jobs and hence allow greater flexibility for individuals to make career 
change across a broader span of jobs. In recognising the pace of technological and 
market change affecting the industry, the CWU has in effect offered to drop its 
opposition to intra firm movement of employees as and when determined by 
management, in return for greater employment security. Hence, restructuring of BT 
                                                 
6 The experience of Work Manager in BT contrasts with that of Bell Atlantic.  Services technicians use 
a hand held terminal but, according to an employee interviewed in Pennsylvania, it has not been 
developed as much as they would like. He commented “I have one in my truck but I never use it” . 
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 production and labour market strategy has not precluded broader agreements on new 
forms of work organisation.   
Comparisons   
At the end of the 1980s and throughout 1990s, all three companies were faced with 
new competition as a result both of government liberalization policies and the spread 
of new telecommunications technologies. Among the tools the three companies all 
attempted to use in this situation were new work practices involving increased task 
flexibility, skill development, consultation and communication within the workforce, 
and flexible employee response to customer needs; we classify all of these as HPWPs. 
Other tools included outsourcing, hiring temporary workers, and buying companies 
which had the desired technologies or operations; these might be called the market 
option. While it is common for companies to use both HPWPs and the market option, 
there is a tension between the two, to the extent that HPWPs depend on mutual 
employer-employee commitment. A company's commitment to HPWPs may reduce 
its ability to cut costs through the market option, and thus increase union leverage. 
The different external environments of the three companies also influenced the mix, 
and the success of these tools; so did the relationship between the companies and the 
unions representing their workers.    
Although historically a leader in telecommunications and computing R&D and 
manufacturing, AT&T's relatively exposed post-deregulation market position led it to 
make a strategic decision to buy in new technological competencies. This limited the 
gains it could expect to obtain from HPWPs, and limited its ability to credibly 
promise gain sharing in return for employee cooperation with the introduction of 
HPWPs. Workplace of the Future, the company's major effort in this regard, appears 
to have done well only where the CWA was strong enough that it had the ability to 
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 shape the implementation of the programme and to contain management 
opportunism; elsewhere in AT&T, the union was not so strong that it could expect to 
steer the programme, but it was strong enough to make it a dead letter where it had a 
significant presence.  
While AT&T was buying in new technological competencies, Nynex was attempting 
to outsource areas of its customer service work. The CWA was able to block this move 
with a combination of threatening industrial action and writing the customer service 
restructuring plan itself. At Nynex, the CWA was also able to steer retraining and 
multi-skilling initiatives so that these were pro-active and focussed on new 
technologies, rather than re-active and focussed on an existing menu of tasks. It did 
this through a combination of non-cooperation with a more limited programme 
introduced by the management and, again, proposing an alternative programme, 
which in this case became a model for other phone companies. 
The CWAs relative strength at Nynex had its foundation in both institutional 
factors (the more secure market position of the company; the union's ability to either 
help or hurt the company in regulatory matters) and in the conscious actions of the 
key agents (a greater tradition of militancy within that region of the union and, 
following that same tradition, the company's willingness to deal with the union at the 
highest level). While it would be tempting to attribute the outcomes of HPWPs to the 
first two of these four factors - plain features of the institutional structure - the fact is 
that at Nynex before its merger into Bell Atlantic, the CWU achieved outcomes which 
were superior to those it achieved in most of the RBOCs; whilst those other 
companies had essentially the same institutional environment, except for some 
regulatory differences between states. 
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 The contrast between the Nynex and BT experiences underscores this point. 
Despite a seemingly unshakable institutional presence, the CWU at BT 
accommodated a range of management initiatives to make the deployment of labour 
more flexible and also to institute minute task control over many skilled technical 
jobs. This represented a considerable cession of the union's customary control over 
work organization, viewed as the price of avoiding compulsory redundancies. Yet the 
union and the workforce did little to support HPWPs, such as the consultation 
programme introduced by management.  
The CWU's approach is not surprising in the context of British trade unionism in 
the period studied. On the one hand, in contrast to their American counterparts, 
unions in large British companies faced relatively little threat to their survival in 
terms of recognition; on the other, they had reason to fear both incorporation and 
marginalisation, a fear that applied, among other things, to their role in the adoption 
of new work practices (Hyman and Mason 1995, 151). Although it would appear that 
the fear of marginalisation has increasingly taken the upper hand since the 1980s, 
most British unions would nevertheless seem to be more cautious in the extent of 
their positive engagement in HIWPs - and the union at BT is indicative of this. Also, 
of course, the danger of union incorporation remains a very real one in some US 
employment sectors, not least in light of the significant tradition of business 
unionism.  Whatever the reason, although the CWU was the union in the most secure 
institutional position of the three studied, it did the least to further the adoption of 
new mutually beneficial work practices, and found itself fighting a rear-guard action 
against Taylorist timekeeping. 
 
6. Conclusion  
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 How does the response of unions affect the nature and fate of new work practices, 
particularly 'high performance' work practices (HPWPs)? We have considered this 
question in the case of an industry facing new competition and, at the same time, 
undergoing rapid technological change. Unions in three different companies dealt 
with work practices very differently. To some extent the difference in response - and 
in outcomes - can be explained in terms of environmental constraints, but to some 
extent it is also a result of strategic choices on the part of both the unions, and the 
employers. 
HPWPs seem, to many, to offer a reliable recipe for mutual gains, yet their 
adoption is patchy. One explanation for this patchy adoption is that it is in the nature 
of HPWPs that they alter power relations within workplaces; for this reason, any 
particular HPWP package can, even while raising productivity, leave either labour or 
capital a net loser. Since many HPWP programmes require the participation of both 
labour and capital, this is often a deal breaker. Our case studies, together with prior 
research, tell us something about the conditions under which HPWP schemes can 
succeed, and why such success is not more common. 
One condition is that the union, as well as the employer, be engaged in the 
development of the program. Given the large number of forms an HPWP package can 
take, any party not engaged in its development is likely to find that the package which 
has been developed slights its interests in some important way, and find it in its 
interest not to cooperate fully in the implementation of the package. Thus, the 
successful new work practices in the Nynex case were those the CWA took an active 
part in developing. This accords with Frost's (2001) findings. 
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 A second factor is the capacity to fight the employer (or power), and its willingness 
to do so (or militancy)7. Union power and militancy can contribute to the successful 
adoption of HPWPs in two distinct ways. One is by serving as elements in an 
enforcement mechanism in a game over HPWP adoption: if a credible threat of union 
retaliation is absent, the employer's promises of gains under HPWP will not be 
credible, and the union can be expected not to cooperate in the implementation of the 
HPWPs. The second is that HPWPs are more likely to succeed if the union has the 
ability to forestall a low-road route. The Nynex case study shows elements of both of 
these. 
A number of different factors may contribute to capacity and willingness to fight. 
Some are institutional, whether in the form of labour  law, or company practice (an 
example of the latter being union access to top management at Nynex, prior to 
merger into Bell Atlantic). Others have to do with the organizational capacities, and 
attitude, of the union. In AT&T's network services division, the CWA had the 
organizational strength needed to engage constructively with the company's 
Workplace of the Future program, and that is where the program succeeded. 
Enforcement may require the mobilization of union members outside of the routines 
of periodic contract bargaining, directly challenging the management agenda. In such 
cases we would say that the requisites of successful defence of a cooperative solution 
include union militancy. We would include in this, cases of the mobilization of the 
members of other unions, or of customers, such as with the CWA District 1 campaign 
in 1995. 
In other cases, however, the union may lack the power to block a low-road route, 
and the employer may not be able to credibly commit to an HPWP program in which 
                                                 
7 We assume that, on the employer's side, the ability and willingness to fight are not in question. 
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 labour gains anything. In this case, the union's actions are likely to be directed at 
blocking, or containing, HPWP initiatives.  AT&T lacked the ability to commit 
credibly to mutual gains of HPWPs in most of its divisions, both because of 
competitive conditions in the long distance market, and because of the strategic 
choice the company had made to buy in technological competencies through mergers 
and contracting.  
It is too easy, however, to think of each of these cases as if they involved nothing 
other than the union and employer responding to hard environmental constraints. 
For the union's part, militancy and engagement grow out of choices made by union 
members and leaders, and they can be put to different uses. So, while we could read 
the CWU's passive role in the restructuring of work at BT as determined by generous 
severance conditions (which drained credibility from any union threat), it seems 
likely that other actions were possible. Similarly, it is easy to imagine courses of 
action at Nynex in which the CWA either did not engage, or failed to engage 
successfully, on work practice issues.  
We should note the particular role played by the case study method in reaching our 
conclusions. A number of key observations - for instance, within a company, which 
HPWPs were reckoned successful, and which not; how these successes and failures 
related to union strength, union attitude, and union participation; how we should 
describe the company's strategy with regard, say, to internal development vs. buy-in 
of technical competencies - would have been difficult to pick up by any other method.  
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